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At a time when the so-called “death 
of theory” has alternately been 
 celebrated or lamented (and com-
pensated by the revival of  academic 
philosophy and its barren subfields 
such as ethics and aesthetics), we 
may well be grateful that the most 
original and exciting Japanese the-
orist of our time, Kojin Karatani, 
is finally becoming more widely 
known in what we used to call the 
West. With the ambitiously named 
Structure of World History, indeed, 
Karatani’s new work arrives in 
English at virtually the same time 
as its publication in Japanese. Not 
only is it a new turn in his own work 
and preoccupations, it opens some 
welcome new paths for our own 
theoretical and political discussions, 
reviving a number of crucial but 
virtually abandoned debates and 
(hopefully) starting some new ones. 
Structure of World History critically 
rereads a  number of  classic texts in 
new perspectives, combines new 
uses of current theory, and reopens 
the traditional debates on modes of 
production in new and more pro-
ductive directions, taking contro-
versial political positions, as well 
as philosophical ones, particularly 
on the relationship of Immanuel 
Kant to Marxism; in short, not only 
does it revive a much-maligned 
approach to  history (world history, 
the philosophy of history, etc.), 
it also intervenes in economics, 
Marxology, theory, and philosophy 
itself.
ANCIENT SOCIETY 
AND THE NEW 
POLITICS: FROM 
KANT TO MODES 
OF PRODUCTION
Fredric R. Jameson
The Structure of World History: 
From Modes of Production to 
Modes of Exchange by Kojin 
Karatani, translated by Michael 
K. Bourdaghs. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2014. 
Pp. 376, 1 illustration. $94.95 
cloth, $26.95 paper.
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For the more standard “enlight-
enment” view, Kant subscribed to 
a view of so-called transcendental 
realities as being fundamentally 
unknowable (however much we 
may still require them ethically). 
The figure of the parallax, how-
ever, suggests that we can none-
theless deduce the position and 
the volume of such realities, as it 
were, blindly and by indirect com-
putation, even where we can never 
confront them directly or in some 
unmediated way. The shift at issue 
here is one from metaphysics to rep-
resentationality, and it has indeed 
seemed to me a useful index to the 
difference between modernity and 
postmodernity: for modernity, this 
failure of knowledge or representa-
tion was an agonizing experience, 
which in literature and philosophy 
alike led to grandiose schemes and 
forms for its evasion—forms that 
constituted a kind of triumph over 
it. For postmodernity, this particu-
lar “death of god” is no longer so 
fraught with anguish, and the anti-
representationality of the parallax 
has seemed to offer a new form of 
representation as such at the very 
moment of its impossibility.
But the other (non-Kantian) 
originality of Transcritique—and 
the one that led most directly to 
the present work—was a revision 
of Karl Marx that seemed to offer 
a new kind of political praxis—
namely, the cooperative move-
ment at the base, or dare I say in 
the interstices, of actually existing 
Karatani’s preceding book 
Transcritique: On Kant and Marx 
(1995) had already proposed a new 
approach to Kant, one unusual 
and unexpected even in the midst 
of what looks like a generalized 
Kant revival. We are far from the 
days in which Jean-Paul Sartre 
remarked that any return to Kant 
always marked a regression to pre-
Marxist and anti-Marxist positions 
(a proposition that surely retains 
much of its relevance). It is at least 
not true of Karatani, whose stra-
tegic move lies not in using Kant 
against Hegel and the dialectic, 
but rather (at least on my reading) 
one who invents the dialectic in the 
first place by way of the antino-
mies, thereby confirming the more 
traditional dialectic’s impatience 
with the pettiness of the law of 
noncontradiction and abandoning 
the attribution to Kant of the 1763 
refutation of the existence of nega-
tivity in nature as such.
Two more interesting features 
of Kant emerge in the  earlier 
book: the ideal of the world 
republic, which becomes central 
in Structure of World History; and 
the overcoming of the impasse 
of the Ding-an-sich (thing-in-
itself) and the unknowability of 
the real by way of the figure of 
the parallax, an attractive astro-
nomical conception that seems to 
be making its way in contempo-
rary philosophy (for example, in 
Slavoj Žižek’s work) as a result of 
Karatani’s speculation.
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of production, which does interest 
me greatly and to which I devote 
the rest of this discussion.
Let me briefly summarize the 
history of the problem, which 
Marx himself alludes to as fol-
lows (in the 1859 preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy): “In broad out-
line the Asiatic, ancient, feudal, 
and modern bourgeois modes of 
production [Produktionsweisen] 
may be designated as epochs 
marking progress in the economic 
development of society.”1 The 
syntax thereby implies that these 
four modes of production would 
be completed by a fifth—namely, 
that from which progress has been 
made or, in other words, primitive 
communism. Meanwhile, the very 
thrust of Marxism as a theory and 
a praxis alike suggests the need to 
specify a sixth mode of production, 
the one that closes off the series of 
“antagonistic forms,” as he calls 
them, and brings “the prehistory 
of human society” to an end—
namely, socialism or communism. 
This is, however, clearly a list and 
not even a description, let alone 
a theory (or “philosophy of his-
tory” as it is contemptuously called 
nowadays). But what people did 
not know for eighty years was that 
Marx had indeed written a sub-
stantial account of these modes of 
production in his 1857 manuscript, 
that trial run of Capital, which we 
call the Grundrisse (floorplans) and 
which was not published until 1939.
capitalism. Some will remember 
that Lenin’s very last writings were 
devoted to cooperatives and to the 
praise of Robert Owen. Others will 
object that the central polemic of 
Capital—at least on the left and 
against Proudhon—was the slash-
ing and omnipresent attack on 
the idea that circulation could be 
the central framework for under-
standing capital as such let alone 
for changing it: production, for 
Marx, always comes first, and new 
value cannot be created in circula-
tion. The very subtitle of Structure 
of World History would seem to 
suggest that Karatani thinks oth-
erwise, and to that effect I quote a 
crucial sentence from Transcritique: 
“While capital organizes social 
relations globally, the moment to 
overturn capital—inexorably at the 
same time as following it—is folded 
within, namely, in the process of 
circulation” (293). This would seem 
to be a serious practical issue, par-
ticularly inasmuch as the dominant 
ideology of our time—free-market 
dogma—is clearly a fundamentally 
circulationist one.
But I’m not personally scan-
dalized by this heterodoxy, this 
heretical—and indeed traditionally 
heretical—displacement of Marxist 
orthodoxy. What interests me more 
is the way in which Karatani has 
arrived at this point (which in his 
formulation I hasten to say is nei-
ther anti-Marxist, post-Marxist, or 
indeed pre-Marxist)—namely, by 
way of the whole matter of modes 
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unique historical facts or events to 
 philosophical or theoretical frame-
works or abstractions—universal 
history then becoming one more 
example of that bad thing called 
totalization. On the other hand, it 
is precisely fear of Eurocentrism 
and its universalism, the sense that 
other cultures and their histories, 
their specificities, are being reduced 
to a single matrix, that is a fantasy of 
Western provenance. I believe that 
we can locate the scandal here in 
geography itself, in the contingen-
cies of our own unique globe and 
its spatial configurations. (They are 
contingent only from the historical 
perspective and not from the geo-
logical or astrophysical one.) Thus, 
universal history turns out to be 
an attempt to philosophize geog-
raphy, to make philosophical sense 
out of its unique spatial folds and 
configurations. Thus, Hegel felt 
obliged, in the greatest and most 
scandalous of all universal histo-
ries, to find dialectical meaning in 
the landscapes in which his various 
world spirits originated, thereby 
giving rise to often grotesque kinds 
of landscape symbolism or alle-
gory. My favorite is the moment 
in which he explains that, in con-
trast to the Nile or the Rhine, the 
immense rivers of the Americas —
the Amazon, the  Orinoco, the 
Mississippi—somehow express in 
their very  overwhelming formless-
ness the youth and newness of the 
New World, as such. But surely the 
philosophizing of geography is still 
Nonetheless, and in whatever 
form, it is surely this list of the fun-
damental structures of human soci-
ety that has earned Marxism (and 
Hegelianism before it) the most 
virulent contemporary attacks on 
its alleged teleology and its imputed 
idealistic reading of the meaning 
of history as such. To be sure, real 
historical developments account 
for the widespread appeal of such 
attacks, not least the omnipresence 
of late capitalism (which Francis 
Fukuyama thought could justify 
the relevance of a slogan such as 
“the end of history”), as well as the 
collapse of state socialism, which 
seemed to invalidate Marxian 
teleological notions of the ways 
in which socialism was coming 
into being within capitalism itself. 
Scarcely irrelevant either is the con-
temporary emphasis on state power 
and its emergence (or omnipres-
ence) in so far as that casts a differ-
ent kind of light on the other end of 
the sequence of “modes of produc-
tion”—namely, on the notion of so-
called primitive communism.
But perhaps two deeper theo-
retical trends need to be men-
tioned in any discussion of this 
much-maligned form or genre 
called “universal history,” to which 
Karatani makes so interesting a 
new contribution here. On the one 
hand, we have to remember the 
fundamental tension or antago-
nism between the historical and the 
sociological or structural, and the 
consequent unwillingness to reduce 
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syntheses could never have. In 
 particular, this new global frame-
work lends his treatment of 
 culture—here concentrated in 
the emphasis on religion (and on 
world religions)—a unique oppor-
tunity to rethink much of our 
 cultural past, as well.
Karatani’s place in all this, 
however, will no doubt be exacer-
bated, not merely by his revival of 
the modes of production debate in 
general, but also by his seemingly 
idealistic revival of Kant’s appeal to 
a world republic that could alone 
secure universal peace.
Late capitalism, which already 
has of course its own not at all 
Utopian world market, has not 
encouraged “one-world” fantasies 
of the type so current after World 
War II. But it might all have been 
otherwise: in a forgotten yet unfor-
gettable exercise in counterfac-
tual history, Arnold J. Toynbee 
sketched out what might have hap-
pened had Megalexandros not died 
so young and been able to pursue 
his restless Homeric vision to the 
pillars of Hercules and perhaps, 
in a second attempt, persuaded his 
soldiers to venture down the Silk 
Road. Then, a new multicultural 
world empire might have ensued, 
with its two official languages—
Greek and Persian—its offerings 
to the Olympians (in the welcome 
absence of the bloodthirsty mono-
theisms), and its peaceful rule 
by the Alexander XXXVII of 
the present day.3 He does not say 
as illicit and as scandalous as it was 
in Hegel’s day?
I want to take as an emblem 
of the transformation of this situ-
ation in our own time the figure 
of Immanuel Wallerstein, whose 
own universal history is very pre-
cisely based on a philosophizing 
or theorization of landscape in his 
notions of core, semiperiphery, and 
periphery.2 To be sure, he is the 
inheritor or synthesizer of many 
contemporary trends—Fernand 
Braudel’s historical vision of the 
Mediterranean, dependency theory 
in Latin America, radical geogra-
phy, and ecology—in this sense, 
he epitomizes the spatial turn in 
modern thought. But he also ben-
efits from globalization or, in other 
words, the subsumption by capital-
ism of all those far reaches of the 
globe that once were outside the 
boundaries of the capitalist market 
system: this is to turn the reproach 
of Eurocentrism inside out and to 
grasp Europe as simply a marker 
for the uniquely dynamic and self-
perpetuating autopoietic virus of 
capitalism, as such; it is also to make 
new research into Europe’s others 
possible as spaces whose ability to 
resist the emergence of capitalism 
becomes an important object of 
inquiry in its own right.
At any rate, I will argue 
that Karatani’s assimilation of 
Wallerstein endows his new ver-
sion of universal history with a 
relevance and a plausibility that 
the older, more purely cultural 
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of his life to exploring this newly 
discovered continent of human 
social organization in his so-called 
Anthropological Notebooks, which 
Engels wrote up in his 1888  classic 
“The Family, Private Property 
and the State,” the latter then, for 
another fifty years or more, stand-
ing as the fundamental statement of 
Marxist orthodoxy on history and 
the modes of production, as such. 
The problem is that this work does 
not square with the description 
Marx made in the Grundrisse, and 
Morgan’s extraordinary celebra-
tion of the Iroquois gens as the most 
perfect human society so far in his-
tory does not quite fit into Marx’s 
list, save as a kind of second state 
of so-called primitive communism 
(the first one being the Paleolithic 
life of hunters and gatherers). In 
effect, Morgan’s and Engels’ enco-
mia to this “military democracy” of 
the Iroquois sets our problem off 
in a new direction—namely, that 
of the problem of the emergence 
of the state and of state power—
which will now deflect the eco-
nomic problematic of the original 
Marxian “modes of production” as 
we shall see in a moment.
Yet, before 1939 (or perhaps we 
should say, before 1953, when the 
Grundrisse became more widely 
available), the principal object of 
debate and contestation was the 
concept of an Asiatic mode of pro-
duction, which Marx does indeed 
briefly touch on in Capital and 
which specifies a stagnant, virtually 
whether that empire would have 
known  capitalism: whether, to use 
Wallenstein’s language, it would 
eventually have undergone a muta-
tion from world empire to world 
system; but it is a question scarcely 
addressed by Kant either, and one 
that once again demonstrates the 
vanity of purely political specula-
tions when devoid of economic 
considerations, such as the swell-
ing reserve army of the unem-
ployed, the closing of the frontier 
(otherwise called “the falling rate 
of profit”), and the incessant emer-
gence of new forms of “primitive 
accumulation” within the appar-
ently mature, completed system 
whose new features some have 
already begun to theorize. At any 
rate, pre- Alexandrian Greece is 
there to remind us that multiple 
states always mean warfare, some-
thing that does not necessarily 
guarantee its absence from the uni-
versal empire as such.
As for the other end of the his-
torical spectrum, in Marx’s own 
lifetime, the omitted mode—
namely, primitive commu-
nism—was suddenly brought to 
unexpected life by an American, 
Lewis Henry Morgan, in his 1877 
book Ancient Society, which Claude 
Lévi-Strauss hailed as the foun-
dational act of anthropology, as 
such, with its extensive account of 
that complex, yet at that time alto-
gether unsuspected, form of social 
organization called the kinship sys-
tem. Marx devoted the final years 
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individualism; only the one or unity 
of the primitive village is now pro-
jected outward and upward into 
the one of the despot who is in 
that Hegelian sense the only indi-
vidual, the only concrete subject in 
that social formation. On the other 
hand, the self-sufficiency of the 
isolated village can also be seen to 
migrate alternately into the form 
of the Greek city-state or the more 
rural isolation of the Germanic 
 village—from which then feudal-
ism seemingly arises. Both of these 
outcomes remain Hegelian in their 
opposition of universality and par-
ticularity; but where in the earlier 
version, the identification of village 
and despot fails to produce the indi-
viduality of its multiple subjects, 
the distance between universal 
and particularity in the German, 
and later the feudal, form leads to 
an individuality that will reach its 
fullest realization only in the social 
atomization of capitalism.  Still, its 
multiple centers must take the path 
of an antagonism towards each 
other, and paradoxically Karatani 
the sees the structural and well-
nigh eternal warfare between them 
as yet another kind of Hegelian 
reciprocity.  Marx thereby already 
grasps war as an integral and struc-
tural creature of primitive commu-
nism and not merely some external 
accident, which is a discovery that 
Pierre Clastres and, in his differ-
ent way, René Girard both thought 
supplied ammunition against 
Marx.
unchanging world of isolated vil-
lages capped by the rule of the despot 
to whom all land belongs and who 
is supported by an imperial bureau-
cracy without a traditional nobility 
or aristocracy.4 Perry Anderson, 
in a destructive and fairly defini-
tive historical review, has demon-
strated the origin, via Hegel, of this 
stereotype in Montesquieu, who 
based it on the Ottoman Empire, 
buttressed by imperfect travel nar-
ratives on Moghul India.5 We may 
ignore the East/West prejudice of 
the term Asiatic; and indeed more 
recent scholarship—most notably 
that of Maurice Godelier—has 
revived this concept for other parts 
of the world, most notably the Inca 
Empire. The problem with remov-
ing this particular mode of produc-
tion from the active list is that in 
that case you are left with nothing 
but feudalism as far as the eye can 
see. Feudalism, then, like the petty 
bourgeoisie, becomes one of the 
most tiresome of orthodox Marxian 
stereotypes. It should be noted that 
one of the most interesting prob-
lems involved in Marx’s original 
excursus lies in the multiple ways in 
which he links the various “modes” 
to one another, suggesting alternate 
thematic links that turn this seem-
ingly chronological (or diachronic) 
list into a multidimensional con-
stellation of forms. Thus, the unity 
of primitive communism is in Marx 
paired with the Asiatic mode in a 
Hegelian fashion: each one incar-
nates the One of the society without 
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before the state is then matched 
with the triumph of the state by 
a  decidedly dystopian downward 
path into the innumerable apoca-
lyptic scenarios with which mass 
culture today is peopled, or unpeo-
pled, as you prefer.
Meanwhile, at least until 
recently, the matter of socialism or 
communism as a mode of produc-
tion has vanished from theoretical 
view, as seemingly has the Utopian 
nature of primitive societies, just 
as both social formations seem to 
have vanished from real life and 
from the actually existing (dare I 
say, dystopian) world of globalized 
capitalism.
But it is here that Karatani’s book 
takes an interesting turn, and that 
Kant returns in unexpected form, 
precisely as the theorist of a new 
form of globalization in his famous 
essay on universal peace and the 
world republic. Here he meets the 
Marx of the world  market—that 
outer limit of capitalism which is its 
most fundamental and destructive 
contradiction—and Wallerstein, 
whose replacement of the Asiatic 
mode as the world empire with 
capitalism as the world system has, 
as I’ve already said, done so much 
to invent a radical geography for 
a Marxism in which it was only 
implicit, and only anticipated in a 
fragmentary way in Lenin’s theory 
of imperialism.
Now let me summarize what 
I take to be the originalities of 
Karatani’s synthesis—first of all, 
Yet, the despot himself returns, 
as we shall see, and becomes a 
figure for state power, a function 
retained in Karatani’s work, who 
views the state as essentially a mat-
ter of the looting and plundering of 
the foreign or nomadic conqueror 
from whom the state evolves (mod-
ern taxes being a civilized form of 
such plunder or tribute).
In the postwar period, and after 
the publication of the Grundrisse 
and its exposition of the very con-
cept of the mode of production, a 
new set of debates emerges. In the 
immediate postwar, which can be 
said to extend up to the failure of 
the 1960s, let’s say around 1975, 
we have a Utopian celebration of 
primitive communism, as Lévi-
Strauss derives it from Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau: I am extremely happy to 
find a discussion here, in Karatani’s 
work, of that great Utopian classic 
that is Marshall Sahlins’s Stone Age 
Economics (1972), supplemented by 
the inevitable structuralist adopted 
classic, Marcel Mauss’s book on the 
gift. But this Utopian moment is 
itself a reflex of the obsession with 
the state and with the emergence of 
state power, which can easily take a 
negative turn after 1968, as it ulti-
mately does in Michel Foucault’s 
work and in the various anarchist 
fixations with power as such, which 
both politically and theoretically 
serve to distract us from the funda-
mentally economic problem of cap-
italism as Marx diagnosed it. The 
Utopian upward slope of the period 
 ON THE STruCTurE OF WOrlD HiSTOry 335
identified as the State, the Nation, 
and Capitalism as the law of value 
or commodity exchange. Now the 
question addressed to the older 
paradigm was always what the 
ultimately determining level is, and 
the short answer, as far as Marxism 
was concerned, was always the 
economic: production, or, in other 
words, the base. But remember 
that, given the dual nature of the 
base, this ultimately determining 
instance could always be ambigu-
ously inflected, either toward the 
forces of production, in which case 
you come up with technological 
determinism (the industrial revo-
lution and so forth) or one of rela-
tions (which might most often be 
the social classes, but which could 
slip off into these or that idealist or 
culturalist deviation).
In Karatani’s work, it is not 
possible to evade the economic 
circles: attention to the state then 
also secures the political questions, 
the questions of power, but here 
a problem arises: for the mode 
of production that precedes state 
power—primitive communism—
what fills this role, what constitutes 
this particular circle? Or does the 
Borromean scheme not yet exist at 
that point? As for the third circle, 
the Nation, its equivalent in the 
older modes is clear enough; begin-
ning with the kinship system, it 
is what secures the existence of 
the community, whether imag-
ined or not. In certain systems, 
two of these three dimensions get 
a modification in the object of our 
study, which was once called a 
“mode of production.” The stan-
dard Marxian, and also structural 
Marxian, schema of this object was 
a system of levels: first the level of 
the base or infrastructure and then 
the level of the superstructures. 
The latter were multiple and could 
be identified as the ideological, reli-
gious or philosophical superstruc-
ture, the juridical superstructure, 
the political superstructure (assum-
ing that you position politics as a 
superstructure), and so forth. The 
former—the base—is essentially 
made up of two levels: that of the 
relations of production (classes, 
for example, property relations) 
and that of the forces of produc-
tion (technology and productivity). 
The most rigorous and consequent 
Althusserians—Barry Hindess and 
Paul Hirst—then defined a mode 
of production as specific articula-
tion of these two levels upon each 
other. There are as many different 
modes of production, according to 
them, as there are distinct forms 
of such articulation—the crucial 
question thereby emerging as to 
what exactly an articulation is and 
what you mean by “to articulate.”6
Karatani has at any rate 
replaced this system with another, 
more striking, but perhaps equally 
structural one—namely, Jacques 
Lacan’s Borromean knots, in which 
three circles are inseparably inter-
twined. For capitalism, he insists 
that these three circles are to be 
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formula while always  insisting 
that exchange here means not 
only capitalist circulation but a 
larger, more all-encompassing 
economic category—an  emphasis 
Marx argues tirelessly against in 
his polemics against Proudhon 
and the latter’s version of asso-
ciationist anarchism. And in that 
respect, of course, Karatani does 
reveal himself to be fully as much 
a follower of Proudhon as of Marx 
himself.
As I’ve said, Karatani’s history 
follows a traditional sequence: 
societies before power (clan or 
tribal societies, primitive commu-
nism); power societies, in which the 
state exists; and finally capitalism 
as a society organized not so much 
around power relations as around 
economic and monetary catego-
ries. But, over each of these forms 
presides what we may call a mode 
of extraction (if you don’t like the 
word “exchange”). Primitive com-
munism is the world of Marcel 
Mauss’s gift, of what Karatani calls 
reciprocity or pooling (it has sev-
eral forms, but we omit those); in 
power societies, often constructed 
on the basis of conquest, distri-
bution takes the form of plunder 
and looting (Republicans would, 
I think, welcome this notion of 
the state and its taxation as a form 
of plunder and theft); capitalism 
is then organized grosso modo 
as what we can call commod-
ity exchange. Now it is clear that 
just as the structuralists liked to 
identified with each other, and we 
have the Nation-State. Is it possible 
to imagine a system in which the 
place of community is conceived 
as being vaster than the Nation, as 
such? Is this then the role of Kant’s 
world republic, of an association of 
nations or a supranational entity 
of some sort (one that is neither a 
Wallersteinian world-empire nor 
that capitalist world-system we call 
globalization)? It is with this ques-
tion that the book ends.
However, we must now 
observe that Karatani’s tripartite 
scheme is shadowed by a fourth 
term, sometimes here identified 
as religion. Clearly, in the pres-
ent state of things, where militant 
or fundamentalist religion has 
replaced the secular parties as the 
only active, violent force for revo-
lutionary change, it is altogether 
fitting for religion to take its 
place in the analysis, functioning 
as what I would more generally 
term ideology—that is, the driving 
superstructural force for legiti-
mation of the various modes of 
production. But, clearly enough, 
religion is something a little more 
concrete and existential, a little 
more collective and social, than 
some mere philosophical value. 
To see where this fits, we need 
to retrace our steps and review 
again the sequence of the modes 
of production as Karatani outlines 
them, and also to grasp why he 
should wish to substitute the term 
“exchange” for “production” in the 
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different and more concrete type of 
social relationship within it).
The premise here is, on the one 
hand, the proposition that each 
social system includes a mecha-
nism to ward off and preempt its 
own dissolution, a kind of self- 
preservation or immune response 
that neutralizes the effects of poten-
tial revolutionary change. Thus, 
the later modes of social organiza-
tion have had somehow to disable 
such mechanisms in order to super-
sede their predecessors: repetition 
and the return of the repressed 
then mark moments in which—for 
good or ill, it should be noted—
one of those older layers then, for 
whatever structural reason or on 
whatever uniquely propitious con-
juncture, comes back to life.
The cooperative scheme, reci-
procity, pooling, and their various 
equivalents in contemporary times 
seem to Karatani to represent such a 
return of the repressed. At any rate, 
this antagonistic layering of the 
social archaeology can usefully be 
compared to Bloch’s nonsynchro-
nous synchronicity in a new and 
fruitful way; and indeed it seems to 
me that the political uses of the new 
Utopian movement are both drawn 
on here and enhanced by this con-
ception of the deep social, which, 
far from being anthropomorphic, 
in fact suggests that our representa-
tions of the individual and the sub-
jective or psychic are in fact enabled 
by a social objectivity from which 
they draw their figuration (as with 
specify the individual social for-
mations as combinations of several 
modes of production all at once, so 
also Karatani conceives of the per-
sistence of earlier kinds of social 
relations or modes of exchange 
in this sense of social interaction 
within later stages. Thus, the 
mode of reciprocity persists at 
some deeper, more repressed level 
within power society and then the 
capitalist one, whereas power itself 
clearly persists within capitalism’s 
more purely economic arrange-
ments. Here Karatani develops a 
new concept of historical repeti-
tion in order to conceptualize such 
returns of the repressed, very often 
detectable in the emergence, or 
shall we say eruption, of the great 
universal religions (among which 
I take it he includes Marxism or 
communism itself).
So now we can better under-
stand where religion fits in 
Karatani’s scheme and how a 
fourth term might emerge from his 
scheme without any accompany-
ing specific mode of production to 
ground it. The universal religion in 
general marks the return, the rep-
etition, the eruption, or repressed 
force of reciprocity into systems 
organized to replace it (with power 
and domination or with unequal 
distribution and exploitation). It 
is generally transmitted by great 
prophecy and takes on an ethical or 
moralizing form (even though its 
metaphysical or superstitious figu-
ration in reality carries a radically 
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The object of history, the past, no 
matter how it is conceived, cannot 
affect present conditions. Historical 
events do not exist and can have 
no material effectivity in the pres-
ent.”7 This astonishing conclusion, 
which in fact spells the end of the 
entire Althusserian enterprise (and 
appropriately results in the authors’ 
renunciation of Marxism, as such), 
is admirably predicated on the 
insistence that Marxism, if it is to be 
anything, must be part of a politi-
cal and not merely epistemological 
praxis. And their stumbling block 
was, to be sure, the failure of the 
theory of modes of production to 
conceptualize transition, or in other 
words a revolution that could lead 
from one system to another, radi-
cally different one. They’re right, 
and we should continue to work 
on that.
But before Hindess and Hirst 
reached that sorry point in their 
rigorous argumentation—either 
unfinished business or outright 
renunciation—earlier in their 
book, they had achieved a rather 
remarkable description of primi-
tive communism as a mode of pro-
duction (a determinate articulation, 
you will remember of the forces 
and the relations of production), 
thus integrating Marx and Morgan. 
They thereby demonstrate the way 
in which, in what they call com-
plex redistribution, the relations 
of production (the kinship system) 
articulates the forces of production 
(or a certain stage of productive 
Sigmund Freud’s archaeological 
accounts of the unconscious). Social 
being comes first, and existential 
experience draws on its possibili-
ties for its own self-understanding 
(in much the same way, I would 
argue, as the discoveries of science 
are enabled in their very structure 
by new forms of the organization 
of social life).
Thus, Karatani’s work con-
cludes with immediate, and surely 
immensely controversial, proposals 
for a new and concrete politics for 
the present day and our current sit-
uation. Those will no doubt receive 
further attention of a critical or exe-
getical nature. But I should like to 
close with a more general remark 
on the value for us of such specula-
tions on modes of production long 
extinct and surely belonging to a 
history that no longer concerns us. 
Indeed, Hindess and Hirst, in that 
most rigorous of all monuments 
to Althusserian scientific thinking 
(Precapitalist Modes of Production, 
1975), conclude in their painstak-
ing interrogation of the various 
concepts of modes of production 
that not only is this concept not his-
torical, but even that “the study of 
history is not only scientifically but 
also politically valueless.” As over 
against their Master, who called 
for a new “science of history,” 
they observe that “it is the notion 
of a Marxist history, of a Marxism 
confined within the conditions 
of the historian’s practice, which 
is the contradictory enterprise…. 
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metabolism with the earth). The 
political level, the level of power, the 
level of the state, as such, is omitted 
from this interaction between the 
two essential levels, and the possi-
bility of a comparable “withering 
away of the state” is projected into 
the concept of socialism or commu-
nism, as well.
But I prefer to end on another 
note, which might well tempt us 
to juxtapose Karatani’s practical 
conclusions with rather different 
but related ones. I therefore con-
clude with the peroration of Lewis 
Henry Morgan’s Ancient Society, 
in which that blood brother of the 
Iroquois and enthusiastic admirer 
of the Paris Commune, evoking 
“the next higher plane of society to 
which experience, intelligence and 
knowledge are already tending,” 
cries, “It will be a revival, in higher 
form, of the liberty, equality and 
fraternity of the ancient gentes.”8
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